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Claire Douglas. *Translate This Darkness: The Life of Christiana Morgan, the Veiled Woman in Jung's Circle.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. 398 pp. \$19.95 (paper). ISBN 0-691-01735-2.

This paperback edition of a work originally published in 1993 is an intelligent and sensitive biography of the Harvard Jungian analytical psychologist Christiana Morgan, one that does justice both to Morgan's productive and creative intellect and to the complexity of her personal life. Known primarily for work carried out with personality theorist Henry A. Murray, Morgan's published works in psychology—limited primarily to a book review, two book chapters, and two journal articles—belie her importance to several streams in humanistic and personality psychology. Over the course of her working life, Morgan's interests centered mainly on personality, creativity, aesthetics, and sentiment as seen through a humanistic and Jungian prism. She was profoundly important in the development of the Thematic Apperception Test and its refinement, as well as to the general understanding of creativity and fantasy, and to the application of Jungian analytical precepts and theory to clinical practice and research.

One cannot get from Morgan's own publications the sense of her importance to psychology in general, or in the lives of such key players in psychology and philosophy as Murray and Alfred North Whitehead in particular. Without Douglas's careful research, Morgan's contributions to the Harvard Psychological Clinic would also remain hidden, contributions which included original research, the development and oversight of the training experiences provided there, and a deep involvement in both the Clinic's and Murray's many published works.

By sifting through Morgan's unpublished papers, personal writings, and correspondence, and with her own deep understanding of Jungian psychology, Douglas, as historian, deftly moves us through the stages of Morgan's life, conveying the inextricable interweaving of the archetypal, the personal, and the professional. With a sensitivity many other biographers do not possess, through a close and sometimes unsettling examination of Morgan's erotic life, Douglas, as Jungian psychologist, shows us how completely Morgan was involved both emotionally and sexually with Murray and, to a lesser extent, with C. G. Jung.

As Morgan juggles her relationships with Murray, with her husband and son, with Murray's wife and daughter, with co-workers at the Clinic and with colleagues in the wider Harvard community, Douglas outlines what is, in some respects, a cautionary tale. Through Morgan's story, Douglas shows us how far a rationalization of passion can take two deep thinkers, in their intellectual, emotional, and sexual interdependence on each other, in their efforts to compartmentalize their roles in each other's lives at the height of their passion and in Morgan's efforts to deal with Murray's waning attention in later years, and especially in the ability of both Murray and Morgan to blind themselves to the impact of their entanglement on others. A deeper picture of Murray appears than would have been possible in a biography that glossed over his need for Morgan and the darker rituals of their relationship. A deeper picture also emerges of Christiana Morgan than a traditional biography could convey. While it is a story that moves the reader to empathy, it also moves us to sadness. By letting us live Morgan's story, Douglas shows the way in which intellectual women—then and, sadly, now—construct their own marginality, first from their families and their colleagues, later from their own work, and finally, from themselves.

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Rick Rylance. *Victorian Psychology and British Culture 1850–1880*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. x + 355 pp. \$74.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-19-812283-7.

Victorian psychology was an amorphous subject and Rylance wants his book to convey its manifold sources and multiple voices. A straight narrative would imply linearity and a single destination; his chosen structure has two distinct parts and no conclusion. Part One is a taxonomy, in which four discourses contributing to Victorian psychology are discussed in four chapters: the discourse of the soul, the discourse of philosophy, the discourse of physiology in general biology, and the discourse of medicine. Part Two analyzes the “texts and contexts” of Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer, and G. H. Lewes, three representatives of physiological psychology. Rylance’s sympathies lie with this direction in psychological theorizing, and his admiration for G. H. Lewes (and George Eliot, who is an *éminence gris* throughout) is clear.

The discourses of Part One are not Foucauldian discourses but “strands of psychological argument” (p. 21), a heuristic taxonomy for purposes of exposition. The discourses overlap. Faculty psychology, for example, appears in all four discourses and is so omnipresent that Rylance describes it as having “discursive pre-eminence” (p. 47). In the discourse of the soul, body and spirit were assumed to be distinct and their relationship was beyond enquiry. Faculty psychology, with its division between higher mental faculties and lower sensations, was orthodoxy within this discourse. Within the philosophy of mind, faculty psychology competed with associationism. Chapters 3 and 4 move on to those discourses that were “scientific.” In Chapter 3, Rylance chooses Lewes, T. H. Huxley, and John Tyndall as the major representatives of physiology. In chapter 4, J. G. Millingen and Henry Holland represent medical discourse. The chapter expands to include George Eliot and Samuel Smiles when discussing Victorian accounts of character and personal identity. Unorthodox sciences are also included: mesmerism and spiritualism under the discourse of the soul; phrenology (although judged not properly scientific) under the discourse of physiology.

I am not persuaded that the representatives of these discourses are well chosen. The choice of Huxley and Tyndall over W. B. Carpenter and David Ferrier gives weight to polemical representatives of scientific naturalism rather than to those physiologists who did most to extend physiology to questions of mind. Ferrier is omitted as too specialist. The representatives of medical discourse, Millingen and Holland, were not in interaction with each other, and it is not clear why such an eminent clinician as Henry Maudsley was omitted.

The analyses of Part Two are detailed accounts both of the major works of Bain, Spencer, and Lewes and of the reviews they received. Rylance describes his technique as similar to Clifford Geertz’s “thick description,” or to George Eliot’s interweaving of detail and metaphor to reveal the springs of human action. Understanding emerges from detail. Bain, Spencer and Lewes represent the movement from associationism to physiological psychology. Rylance is